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It is by no means clear that the demand and supply for financial assets by
opaque institutions simply reflect retail forces. In the prevailing equilibrium
models of securities markets, demand comes from the individuals solving
portfolio optimization problems. However, when we take account of the
intervening contractual relations under which opaque institutions operate, it
seems heroic to think that they mirror these forces (Ross 1989, p. 543).
In the past fifteen years, starting in 1974, we have seen an
unprecedented wave of financial innovation in United States capital
markets. The main areas of innovation have been the securitization and
repackaging of debt and the emergence of derivative securities markets.
The purpose of this paper is to show how some of these developments
can be explained by the nature of the benefits guaranteed by defined
benefit pension plans and the investment strategies they employ to
hedge their liabilities.
In 1988, assets of pension plans amounted to almost $2.5 trillion.
Most of this money was invested in debt and equity securities. Pension
funds accounted for about 25 percent of the total holdings of common
stock and 39 percent of the total of corporate and foreign bonds. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the investment policy of pension funds has
had a profound effect on the direction and rate of innovation in the
capital markets.
Perhaps the most striking and surprising development has been the
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emergence of new securities and markets designed to provide long-
duration, dollar-denominated cash flows. Examples are the markets for
zero coupon bonds, collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), and
guaranteed investment contracts (GICs)o~
From the perspective of household lifetime utility maximization, it
is hard to see why much of a demand would arise for such securities.
Economic theory would suggest that households want securities that
hedge against the main sources of risk to their future stream of
consumption. A long-term nominal bond has little value as a hedge
against the risks faced by households because it is so vulnerable to
inflation risk.
This paper traces the demand for long-duration, dollar-denomi-
nated debt to the nature of the benefits guaranteed by defined benefit
pension plans and to the immunization strategies they employ to hedge
their liabilities. It also explains the emergence of options and financial
futures markets along similar lines. It then explores several possible
explanations for the failure of pension plans to provide automatic
protection against inflation risk. The analysis focuses on corporate
pension plans, but most of it applies as well to state and local govern-
ment defined benefit plans.
An important theme underlying this paper is that most of the
innovations discussed herein were not the creations of the nonfinancial
corporations issuing the primary debt and equity securities. Instead they
were created by financial intermediaries, which transformed these
primary securities into the types of claims that pension funds wanted to
hold. This points out an important fact: the portfolio demands of lenders
do not necessarily determine the type of securities issued by the ultimate
borrowers.
The Nature of Defined Benefit Pension Liabilities
Although employer pension programs vary in design, usually they
are classified into two broad types: defined contribution and defined
benefit. These two categories are distinguished in the law under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
The defined contribution arrangement is conceptually the simpler
of the two. Under a defined contribution plan, each employee has an
account into which the employer and the employee (in a contributory
plan) make regular contributions. Benefit levels depend on the total
~ See Smith and Taggart (1989) for a discussion of the major innovations in the
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contributions and investment earnings of the accumulation in the
account. Defined contribution plans are in effect tax-deferred retirement
savings accounts held in trust for the employees.
Contributions usually are specified as a predetermined fraction of
salary, although that fraction need not be constant over the course of a
career. Contributions from both parties are tax-deductible, and invest-
ment income accrues tax-free. At retirement, the employee typically
receives an annuity whose size depends on the accumulated value of the
funds in the retirement account.
Often the employee has some choice as to how the account is to be
invested. In principle, contributions may be invested in any security,
although in practice most plans limit investment options to various
bond, stock, and money market funds. The employee bears all the
investment risk; the retirement account is by definition fully funded,
and the firm has no obligation beyond making its periodic contribution.
In a defined benefit plan, by contrast, the employee’s pension
benefit entitlement is determined by a formula that takes into account
years of service for the employer and, in most cases, wages or salary.
The plan sponsor guarantees this benefit regardless of the investment
performance of the pension fund assets.
In a typical defined benefit plan, employees might receive a pension
benefit equal to 1.5 percent of final salary per year of service less 1.25
percent of their Social Security benefit times years of service. Thus, an
employee retiring after 40 years of service with a final salary of $50,000
per year and a Social Security benefit of $10,000 per year would receive
a pension benefit of 60 percent of $50,000 less half of $10,000, or $25,000
per year.
The annuity promised to the employee is the employer’s liability.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), an agency of the
U.S. government, guarantees the pension benefits promised under
defined benefit plans up to certain limits. Plan sponsors pay insurance
premiums that depend on the number of employees covered by the plan
and on how well funded the plan is.
Large corporations usually offer a defined benefit plan as their
primary pension plan and supplement it with voluntary defined contri-
bution plans (called savings or profit-sharing plans). To encourage
participation, the sponsor often makes matching contributions to these
supplementary defined contribution plans, and the employee decides
how to allocate the money. When a defined contribution plan is the
primary pension plan, however, the employee often is not required to
make any contributions, and the employer usually makes the asset
allocation decisions.
In a defined benefit plan, the assets serve as collateral for the firm’s
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separate from the corporation. Legally these funds are trusts, and
funding and asset allocation decisions are supposed to be made in the
best interests of the beneficiaries, regardless of the financial condition of
the sponsoring organization.
The pensions offered under a defined benefit plan are best viewed
as participating annuities that offer a guaranteed minimum nominal
benefit determined by the plan’s benefit formula. This guaranteed
benefit is enriched from time to time at the discretion of management
based on the financial condition of the plan sponsor, the increase in the
living costs of retirees, and the performance of the fund’s assets.
The evidence in support of this contention is that many plans have
given ad hoc voluntary benefit increases to plan participants in the past
(Clark, Allen, and Sumner 1983). While these increases have been
viewed by many as evidence of implicit cost-of-living indexation, they
are very different from a formal COLA or cost-of-living adjustment
(Cohn and Modigliani 1985; Ippolito 1986). Rather, they are an implicit
claim of the employees on the plan sponsor.
The implicit pension obligation is a very complex contingent claim,
in both the economic and the legal sense. One way to view this
contingent claim is as an employee ownership share in the pension fund
surplus. In the case of corporate pension plans, it seems clear that if the
sponsoring corporation does not do well financially, then employees
cannot expect to get anything more than the minimum guaranteed
formula benefit. Mounting evidence has shown that corporations facing
severe financial difficulties, either because of low profitability or because
they are under threat of hostile takeover, will raid their overfunded
pension plans and give employees only the legal minimum (VanDerhei
and Harrington 1989; Peter~en 1989; Pontiff, Shleifer, and Weisbach 1989).
On the other hand, if the corporation does well financially, and if
retired employees face inflation, then evidence suggests that the corpo-
ration will help them out with ad hoc benefit increases. It is for this
reason that I have referred to this type of pension benefit as a
participating annuity with a guaranteed floor. This floor is fixed in
nominal terms because, unlike Social Security, no automatic indexation
of benefits occurs either before or after retirement.
Both the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the U.S.
Congress have adopted the present value of the guaranteed nominal
floor as the appropriate measure of a sponsor’s pension liability. In
FASB Statement 87, the rule-making body of the accounting profession
specifies that the measure of corporate pension liabilities to be used on
the corporate balance sheet in external reports is the accumulated
benefit obligation--that is, the present value of pension benefits owed to
employees under the plan’s benefit formula absent any salary projec-
tions and at a nominal rate of interest.110 Zvi Bodie
In its Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA), Congress
defined the current liability as the measure of a corporation’s pension
liability and set limits on the amount of tax-qualified contributions a
corporation could make as a proportion of the current liability. OBRA’s
definition of the current liability is essentially the same as FASB
Statement 87’s definition of the accumulated benefit obligation.2
Why Pension Plans Do Not Provide Inflation
Insurance
Why are pension plans in the United States not designed to offer
automatic inflation indexation? One reason frequently cited in the past
was that plan sponsors had no way to hedge the risk through an
appropriate investment strategy.3
While it is true that in the past no financial instruments offering a
risk-free real rate of return have been issued in the United States, they
would have come into existence, had there been a demand for them by
pension funds. Several attempts by financial intermediaries to offer
inflation- indexed investment products have failed, in large part because
of lack of interest on the part of institutional investors like pension
funds. Recently several financial institutions have introduced financial
instruments linked to the CPI.4 Their success or failure will put the "lack
of inflation hedge" explanation to the test in the next several years.
Another explanation for the lack of inflation protection in pension
plans is that people already have enough inflation insurance. Most
notably, Social Security retirement benefits are indexed to wages during
the preretirement years and to the CPI after retirement. Furthermore,
much personal saving takes the form of investment in residential real
estate, which while not riskless, is probably hedged against inflation risk
(Feldstein 1983; Summers 1983).
Finally, money illusion must be considered. In economies where
the rate of inflation is not too high, people mistakenly treat nominal
values as if they were real. Even professional financial planners often fall
into the trap of treating nominal annuities as if they were real, for
retirement planning purposes.
2 For an alternative view that sees the projected benefit obligation as at least as
appropriate a measure, see Black (1989), Arnott and Bernstein (1988), and Ambachtsheer
(1987). Bodie (1990c) discusses the issue at length and concludes that the approach
adopted by FASB is correct.
3 This explanation, however, raises the question of why integrated defined benefit
plans insure against Social Security risk even though they have no apparent way of
hedging that risk through an appropriate investment strategy.
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Many financial planners and benefits specialists use the following
rule of thumb to judge the adequacy of retirement income: add expected
Social Security benefits and expected pension benefits and divide their
sum by preretirement income. If this so-called "replacement ratio" is
greater than 0.8 (or 80 percent), the individual will have adequate
retirement income and does not need to supplement it with other
retirement saving.
This approach ignores the effect of post-retirement inflation on
pension benefits and therefore can lead to inadequate saving for
retirement (Bodie 1990b). For example, imagine a 45-year-old who works
for a firm that has a defined benefit pension plan offering a benefit equal
to 1.5 percent of final pay times the number of years of service. His
salary is now $50,000 per year, and he does not expect it to grow in real
terms.
By the time he retires he will have worked for the company 40
years, and his pension benefit will therefore be 60 percent of his final
salary or $30,000 per year. He expects Social Security to provide a benefit
of $10,000 per year, so his expected combined retirement income is
$40,000 and his replacement ratio 80 percent.
Now suppose that after retirement inflation is 5 percent per year. At
that rate prices double roughly every fourteen years. His Social Security
benefit has a COLA (cost-of-living adjustment), so it will increase in
tandem with inflation. But his pension benefit does not. The $30,000 of
pension income, which may have been adequate when he retired, will
have one-half of its original purchasing power when he is halfway
through retirement.
Most retirement planning professionals currently pay little more
than lip service to post-retirement inflation in calculations of income
replacement ratios. This replacement ratio fallacy may lead employees to
mistakenly think that a defined benefit plan with a final average pay
formula offers them more inflation protection than it really does. What
incentive does an employer have to incur the costs of offering inflation
protection to employees who are already behaving as though they had
it? By raising the issue, the employer might alert the employees to a
previously unnoticed inadequacy in their benefits package and cause
discontent.
The Corporate Pension. Guarantee and Funding and
Investment Strategies
If a corporate pension fund has an accumulated benefit obligation
that exceeds the market value of its assets, FASB Statement 87 (FASB 87)
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its corporate balance sheet. If, however, the pension assets exceed the
accumulated benefit obligation, the corporate sponsor cannot include
the surplus on its balance sheet.
This asymmetric accounting treatment expresses a widely held view
among pension professionals that as guarantor of the accumulated
pension benefits, the sponsoring corporation is liable for pension asset
shortfalls but does not have a clear right to the entire surplus in case of
pension overfunding. Recent court rulings in cases of terminations of
overfunded plans have left unclear how much of the surplus belongs to
the plan sponsor, but it is clearly less than 100 percent.~
The asymmetry between the treatment of pension deficits and
surpluses creates an incentive for pension plan sponsors to pursue an
investment policy of immunizing their pension liabilities.6 If the firm’s
shareholders own less than 100 percent of the pension fund net worth,
then any increase in the riskiness of the pension assets will reduce the
market value of shareholders’ equity.
The corporate guarantee of the accumulated benefit obligation is in
effect a put option on the investments of the pension fund with an
exercise price equal to the present value of the accumulated benefit
obligation. The pension fund net worth is analogous to a call option. A
well-known result in the theory of option pricing is that if the volatility
of the underlying security’s price increases, then the put and the
corresponding call option will both increase in value by the same
amount (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 1989, p. 564). In the case of a defined
benefit pension fund, if the values of both the corporate pension
guarantee (a liability of the corporation) and the pension fund net worth
(only partially a corporate asset) increase by the same amount, the value
of corporate equity must go down.
Immunization and Duration Matching
One way to minimize this cost to the corporation’s shareholders is
to immunize the pension liability through an investment strategy of
duration matching. For example, suppose we can characterize the firm’s
pension liability as a perpetual annuity. Suppose further that the term
structure of interest rates is flat.
5 Early papers on pension finance by Sharpe (1976) and Treynor (1977) assumed that
the pension trust was essentially an asset of the sponsoring corporation. Bulow and
Scholes (1983), however, argue convincingly that the corporation’s shareholders and the
plan beneficiaries actually share ownership. The only way that the corporation’s share-
holders can get the entire pension fund surplus is by reducing the level of funding in the
future. Thus while the corporation may own less than 100 percent of the pension fund
surplus in the short run, in the long run it can take it all.
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The duration of this liability is (l+y)/y years, where y is the level of
interest rates. By investing in a bond or other fixed-income securities
with this same duration, the corporation can ensure that the value of its
pension assets will always equal the value of the pension liability. A
simple way to do this would be to invest in zero coupon bonds with a
maturity of (l+y)/y years. As y changes and as the bonds in the pension
fund portfolio mature, management has to continuously readjust the
portfolio to maintain a duration equal to (l+y)/y.
The pursuit of duration-matching strategies by pension funds has
created a demand for fixed-income instruments with a guaranteed
duration. Such innovations of the past ten years as zero coupon bonds,
collateralized mortgage obligations, interest rate swaps, and interest rate
futures contracts can be viewed, at least in part, as the market response
to this demand. They are all ways of eliminating duration uncertainty
from traditional bonds and mortgages.
Pension Overfunding and Contingent Immunization
If the corporation’s management wants to maximize shareholder
wealth, why should it choose to fund the pension plan and why should
it invest in anything but securities that exactly hedge the accumulated
benefit obligation liability? There are at least four reasons why firms
fund their defined benefit pension plans.
First, minimum standards are imposed by law. The purpose of
these standards is to insure the promised pension benefits against the
risk of default by the corporate sponsor and to protect the government
(and therefore the taxpayer) from abuse of the insurance provided by
the government. Recent changes in the law have made the insurance
premium charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
a function of the degree of underfunding and have eliminated the
possibility of voluntary termination of an underfunded pension plan
(Utgoff 1988).
Second, plan sponsors have big tax incentives to fund their defined
benefit plans. Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) have shown that the tax
advantage derived from a defined benefit pension plan stems from the
ability of the sponsor to earn the pretax interest rate on pension
investments. In order to maximize the value of this tax shelter, it is
therefore necessary to invest entirely in assets offering the highest
pretax interest rate. Because under the U.S. tax code dividends from
investments in common and preferred stock are taxed at a much lower
rate than interest on bonds, corporate pension funds should invest
entirely in taxable bonds and other fixed-income investments. Recent
changes in the tax laws have reduced the ability of pension plans to
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contributions as long as pension assets are less than 150 percent of the
accumulated benefit obligation.7
Third, funding its pension plan provides the sponsoring corpora-
tion with financial "slack" that can be used in case of possible financial
difficulties the firm may face in the future.8 Because the law still allows
plan sponsors facing financial distress to draw upon excess pension
assets by reduced funding or, in the extreme case, voluntary plan
termination, the pension fund can effectively serve as a tax-sheltered
contingency fund for the corporation.
Finally, PBGC insurance covers only a portion of the promised
benefits for the highly compensated plan participants. Funding provides
a cushion of safety for this group, which includes top corporate
management.9
If the pension fund is overfunded, then a 100 percent fixed-income
portfolio is no longer required to minimize the cost of the corporate
pension guarantee. Management can invest surplus pension assets in
equities, provided it reduces the proportion so invested when the
market value of pension assets comes close to the value of the accumu-
lated benefit obligation. Such an investment strategy is known as
portfolio insurance or contingent immunization.
The pursuit by pension funds of portfolio insurance strategies has
created a market for index options and futures contracts. The imple-
mentation of these strategies is feasible without these derivative securi-
ties, but their existence makes implementation less costly and less
disruptive to the activities of portfolio managers, s0
Pension Fund Investment Policy in Practice
How do corporate pension funds actually invest their money? No
significant difference in the overall asset mix is found between defined
benefit and defined contribution plans. Regardless of plan type, corpo-
rate pension funds tend to invest between 40 and 60 percent of assets in
equities and the remainder in fixed income securities (Greenwich
Research Associates 1988).
If the only goal guiding corporate pension policy is shareholder
wealth maximization, then it is hard to understand why the pension
7 The relevant law is the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA).
a See Bodie et al. (1987) for a more complete discussion of the financial slack motive
for funding a pension plan.
9 See Light and Perold (1987) for a more complete discussion of this point.
10 Leland and Rubinstein (1988) have described how the emergence of a market for
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fund would invest in equities at all. A policy of 100 percent bonds would
both maximize the tax advantage of funding the pension plan and
minimize the cost of guaranteeing the defined benefits.
This suggests that corporate management views the pension plan as
a trust for the employees and manages fund assets as if the pension plan
were a defined contribution plan with a guaranteed floor specified by
the benefit formula.11 In doing so, it balances the goal of shareholder
wealth maximization against the goal of employee welfare maximiza-
tion.
One possible approach consistent with this underlying assumption
is to manage the assets so as to maximize employee welfare subject to
the constraint that the cost of providing the benefit guarantee is
minimal. Such a policy could lead an overfunded pension plan to invest
in equities. But it would also dictate that a firm should reduce the
proportion of its portfolio invested in equities if the degree of overfund-
ing falls. In other words, it should pursue a policy of portfolio insurance
or contingent immunization.
Recent trends in pension asset allocation are broadly consistent
with this explanation. Some pension funds pursue portfolio insurance
strategies openly, often using stock index futures. Others accomplish a
similar result through stop-loss orders and similar trading techniques in
the stocks themselves.
The widespread practice of writing covered call options can also be
interpreted as evidence that pension funds want to convert some of their
investment in corporate equities into debt. By writing a call option on an
appropriate stock market index, a pension fund can effectively trans-
form a portfolio of stocks into a portfolio of corporate bonds maturing at
the expiration date of the option.l~
Berkowitz, Logue and Associates (1986) found that the average
risk-adjusted performance of ERISA plans from 1968 to 1983 was lower
than returns experienced by other diversified portfolios in U.S. financial
markets. This could be interpreted as evidence that pension funds
pursue contingent immunization strategies. Under this interpretation,
the difference in their average return is in effect the insurance premium.
Berkowitz and Logue also found that more reallocation between stocks,
bonds and cash equivalents occurred in defined benefit pension plans
than in the control group. This too can be interpreted as evidence of
portfolio insurance practices.
u For other possible explanations of pension fund investment in equities see Bodie
(1990c).
i2 See the appendix for a more complete explanation of how this transformation is
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In cross-sectional studies of pension asset allocation, we would
expect to find that the proportion of fund assets invested in equities
would be positively related to plan overfunding. Friedman (1983) found
no significant correlation between the allocation of defined benefit plan
assets and the funding status of the plan. Bodie et al. (1987) confirmed
this finding. In both of these studies, however, the unit of observation
was the corporation rather than individual plans. Since many corpora-
tions have several plans, some of which are overfunded (usually the
ones for salaried employees) and some underfunded, it could be that the
effect we are looking for is obscured at the level of the firm.
Recent changes in accounting rules and tax law are likely to
reinforce the strategy of immunization. As a result of FASB 87, corporate
officers concerned with the adverse impact of an unfunded accumulated
benefit obligation on the corporate balance sheet will have a greater
incentive than before to hedge against interest rate risk.
Two provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
(OBRA) are relevant. The first is the strengthening of the claim of the
PBGC on corporate assets for underfunded pension plans. This will
eliminate some of the incentive for such corporations to take risks with
the assets in the pension plan and therefore will increase the proportion
invested in fixed-income securities.
The second relevant provision of OBRA is the imposition of strict
funding limits on pension plans. If pension plans gradually become less
overfunded, the cost of providing benefit guarantees will become more
sensitive to the proportion invested in equities. The plans will therefore
have an incentive to invest more in fixed-income securities.
Financial Innovation as a Response to the Investment
Demands of Pension Funds
Most of the innovations in the fixed income securities markets since
the early 1970s have been in response to an underlying increase in the
level and volatility of interest rates and the desire to hedge against the
risks created thereby. These interest rate developments were triggered
largely by the inflationary trend that began in the late 1960s.
Figure 1 shows the history of a 10-year moving average of the
inflation rate and the interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds, from 1958
to 1988. If we interpret the moving average of past inflation rates as a
proxy for the expected rate of inflation, we can explain the trend in
long-term interest rates almost entirely on the basis of the trend in
expected inflation.
The initial response to the high and unpredictable interest rates of
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Figure 1
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debt, as both borrowers and lenders shied away from long-term com-
mitments at fixed rates. Smith and Taggart (1989) point to Citicorp’s $850
million issue in 1974 as the key development in this area. Many bond
market analysts were predicting a permanent shortening of the maturity
structure of fixed-rate debt and a complete transition to floating-rate
corporate debt and adjustable-rate mortgages. The last thing they
imagined was a surge in the exact opposite direction.
But then came ERISA. In 1974 Congress passed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act and in one bold stroke transformed the
structure of institutional demand for fixed-income securities. The critical
features of ERISA for the capital markets were its codification of the legal
status of corporate defined benefit pension obligations and its imposi-
tion of minimum funding requirements. The new age of bond immuni-
zation and duration matching began.
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new. Life insurance companies always had an investment demand for
long-term, fixed-income securities to hedge their whole-life and annuity
products. But consumer demand for these products went into eclipse in
the 1970s because of the inflationary bulge and resulting high interest
rates. Sales of new policies fell sharply, and loans to policyholders at
contractual interest rates as low as 4 percent per year were siphoning
funds away at a pace that alarmed insurance executives.
Eventually, the environment of inflation and interest rate uncer-
tainty of the 1970s led the insurance industry to innovate in the retail
market of the 1980s. They designed universal life and variable life
insurance policies, offering interest rates that were both higher and
more adjustable than those embodied in traditional whole-life policies.
Joining forces with mutual funds, the life insurance industry also started
offering insured savings plans that allowed a broader spectrum of
investment instruments, including money market funds and common
stocks. Thus retail demand in the insurance market has led to a
shortening of the maturity structure of life insurance company invest-
ments.
The new demand for long-duration, fixed-income securities has
come primarily from pension funds. Life insurance companies have
played an important role in this market both by directly assuming
pension fund liabilities and by providing guaranteed investment con-
tracts (GICs) to pension funds. GICs are essentially zero coupon bonds
issued by insurance companies, which hedge the liability by investing in
fixed-income securities. Insurance companies thus have become an
additional layer of financial intermediation. Their demand for long-
duration debt is ultimately derived from the demand by pension funds.
While the immunization strategies of pension funds have spurred
innovation in the fixed-income securities markets, pension fund contin-
gent immunization and portfolio insurance strategies have created a
market for index options and futures contracts. The implementation of
these strategies is feasible without these derivative securities, but their
existence makes implementation less costly and less disruptive to the
activities of portfolio managers.
Pension fund involvement in writing covered call options has also
been an important factor contributing to the growth of stock options
markets. As explained before, buying stocks and writing call options on
them is similar to investing in fixed-income securities. Pension funds
that write call options on stocks or stock indexes are in effect converting
some of their investment in equities into short-term fixed-income
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Future Innovations
As people rely more and more on pensions and private savings to
provide their retirement income, demand for suitable financial products
will surely increase. The existing array of life annuities offered by life
insurance companies and pension plans has one major shortcoming: the
lack of protection against inflation (Bodie 1989b and 1990b).
Until recently investors had no simple way to completely hedge
inflation risk in the U.S. capital market (Bodie 1990a). Recently, how-
ever, several financial institutions have issued securities linked to the
U.S. consumer price level. The new securities were issued first by the
Franklin Savings Association of Ottawa, Kansas, in January 1988 in two
different forms.
The first is certificates of deposit, called Inflation-Plus CDs, insured
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and
paying an interest rate tied to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Interest
is paid monthly and is equal to a stated real rate plus the proportional
increase in the CPI during the previous month.
The second form is twenty-year noncallable collateralized bonds,
called Real Yield Securities or REALs. These offer a floating coupon rate
equal to a stated real rate plus the previous year’s proportional change
in the CPI, adjusted and payable quarterly.
Two other financial institutions have recently followed the lead of
Franklin Savings.13 If the trend continues, we will have reached a
milestone in the history of this country’s financial markets. For years
prominent economists at all points of the ideological spectrum have
argued that the U.S. Treasury should issue such securities, and scholars
have speculated why private markets for them have not hitherto
developed.14 The current innovative environment in the U.S. financial
markets appears to finally have put an end to this speculation by
producing private indexed bonds in several forms.
From the perspective of this paper, what is interesting about these
developments is that savings institutions have undertaken to offer this
insurance against inflation risk without having a way of completely
hedging that risk through their investment policy. The owners of these~
institutions are bearing the inflation risk through their own capital.
This is a viable situation for small amounts of inflation insurance.
13 In August 1988, Anchor Savings Bank became the second U.S. institution to issue
REALs, and in September 1988, JHM Acceptance Corporation issued modified index-
linked bonds subject to a nominal interest rate cap of 14 percent per annum. The
investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated is the underwriter and
market maker for REALs.
i4 See, for example, the analysis in Fischer (1986).120 Zvi Bodie
Should the demand grow, however, it seems clear that the additional
supply of price-indexed securities would have to come from the nonfi-
nancial sector.
One promising source of CPI-linked investments for an inflation
insurance intermediary is CPI-linked home mortgages. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is about to certify a
variety of price-level-adjusted mortgages (PLAMs) for Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) approval. Once FHA mortgage insurance is
available and the tax status of PLAMs is clarified, they could account for
a significant portion of new lending in the home mortgage market.15
Nonfinancial businesses have shown some willingness to issue debt
securities that are indexed to the prices of their output. A financial
intermediary could pool such bonds in order to synthesize an invest-
ment that hedges annuities indexed to broader price measures (Blinder
1976).
With a large market for price-indexed securities and their deriva-
tives, pension plan sponsors and other financial institutions could then
offer annuities with inflation insurance features. Sponsors who already
offer their employees several investment options for their supplemen-
tary savings plans can simply expand the set of alternatives to include
CPI-linked securities.
Merton (1983) has proposed a more radical innovation. Instead of
indexing retirement annuities to the cost of living, he suggests indexing
them to aggregate per capita consumption. His proposal is based on a
model of lifetime household optimizing behavior that suggests that such
consumption-indexed annuities might enhance welfare considerably.
Merton envisions a major role for the government in making this type of
product possible. In view of the innovative atmosphere in the U.S.
financial markets in recent years, however, it is conceivable that the
private sector can manage it without help from the government.
Summary and Conclusions
Pension funds have played a critical role in the evolution of the
markets for debt and equity securities and their derivatives in the United
States over the past fifteen years. Defined benefit pension plans offer
annuities that have a guaranteed floor specified by the benefit formula.
In order to minimize the cost to the sponsor of providing this guarantee,
a strong incentive exists to invest an amount equal to the present value
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of the accumulated benefit obligation in fixed-income securities with a
matching duration.
The increased volatility of interest rates and the tightening of
government regulations in the past fifteen years have made it important
for pension funds to find efficient ways to hedge their liabilities. The
result has been rapid growth in the use of immunization and contingent
immunization strategies.
Many of the innovations in the U.S. financial markets during this
period can be interpreted as responses to the hedging demands of
pension funds. Some examples are the emergence of the markets for
zero coupon bonds, guaranteed investment contracts, collateralized
mortgage obligations, options, and financial futures contracts. A useful
way to predict financial innovations is to forecast the future hedging
demands of pension funds and other institutions catering to the retire-
ment income needs of our aging population.
Most of the innovations noted in this paper were not the creations
of the corporations issuing the primary debt and equity securities.
Instead, they were created by financial intermediaries, which trans-
formed these primary securities into the types of claims that pension
funds wanted to hold. This points out an important fact: the portfolio
demands of lenders do not necessarily determine the type of securities
issued by the ultimate borrowers.122 Zvi Bodie
Appendix: Using Derivative Securities to Convert
Equity into Debt.
The purpose of this appendix is to show how derivative securities
such as forward contracts and options can be used to convert a portfolio
of common stocks into a bond. To keep the exposition simple, we will
assume the portfolio is a single stock that pays no dividends, and we
will assume that options on the stock are of the European type and
therefore can only be exercised at expiration.
Suppose you are holding a share of XYZ stock with a current price
of S. Now consider a forward contract on the stock with a forward price
of X payable T years from now. Because the contract commits you to
hand over the stock T years from now in exchange for X dollars, you can
convert the stock into a zero coupon bond maturing in T years by selling
such a forward contract. In other words, a combination of the stock plus
a short position in the forward contract is equivalent to a zero coupon
bond.
Instead of selling a forward contract, suppose you sell a call option
with an exercise price of X. The call option is similar to the forward
contract in that if T years from now the stock price exceeds X, you will
have to hand over the stock in exchange for X dollars. The call option
differs from the forward contract in that if at the expiration date the stock
price is less than X, the option will not be exercised and you will be left
with the stock.
The combination of the XYZ stock and a short position in the call
option is therefore similar to a zero coupon XYZ bond with default risk.
The analogy with default risk is that if XYZ Corporation were to default
on its debt, then its unsecured bondholders would become stockhold-
ers. If the exercise price, X, is far below the current stock price, S, then
the call option is very likely to be exercised. In our analogy, this would
correspond to the default risk on the bond being very low.THE LENDER’S VIEW: THE CASE OF PENSION FUNDS 123
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Peter L. Bernstein*
Zvi Bodie’s paper asserts that the major financial innovation of the
1980s has been the development of new securities and markets designed
to provide long-duration, fixed-income cash flows. He traces the origin
of these innovations to the high level and unprecedented volatility of
interest rates and the demand for instruments that would hedge against
"the risks created thereby." Bodie then goes on to argue at length that
defined benefit pension plans have been the major source of demand for
these new securities, because of the need of pension funds for immu-
nization strategies to secure the nominal benefits they have promised to
their employees.
My comments on Bodie’s paper will cover three topics. I begin with
a brief comment on Bodie’s omission of other large players in this area
that were just as important as pension funds; he may also be exagger-
ating the role of FASB 87 as a motivator for the pension funds, at least in
the early years of the decade. Second, by focusing on the long-duration
innovations, Bodie’s paper makes little distinction between government
and corporate issues, but it is the corporate side that concerns us here.
Finally and perhaps most important, in studying the capital markets
from the standpoint of the lender, we must put the whole question into
a setting that is wider than the world of pension funds alone.
Expansion of the Long-Term Bond Market
Pension funds were not the only buyers of long-duration, fixed-
income securities, and immunization of liabilities was not the only
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investor motivation. Bodie’s paper provides one answer to the question
of why lenders are more willing to provide more debt than in the past.
Nevertheless, although Bodie is on solid ground in placing emphasis on
FASB 87, the explosion in the demand for fixed-income securities, and in
particular, for long-duration, fixed-income securities, preceded FASB 87
by five years at least. FASB 87 did make investment people wake up at
long last to the reality that assets exist to fund liabilities, not simply to
earn some rate of return, but that belated awakening was by no means
the only force that drove investors into the long-term bond market with
such enthusiasm.
Rather, the degree to which record-high nominal long-term interest
rates lagged the decline in inflation after 1981 made long-duration
instruments an almost irresistible asset for any investor, regardless of
that investor’s liability structure. It could hardly have been just the
demands of pension funds seeking immunization of their liabilities that
drove total returns in the long-term bond market to 27 percent a year
from the end of 1981 to the beginning of 1986, during which time
FASB 87 was still only a topic of discussion and the volume of open
market borrowing was enormous by any standard of measurement. Nor
would indexing portfolios to the major bond market indexes have
become such a popular strategy if immunization had been the primary
objective of fixed-income investors.
Furthermore, in addition to the demand for bonds in general, the
demand for long-duration instruments was not limited to pension
funds. Practitioners in the bond market had learned well that central
lesson of Homer and Leibowitz’s popular Inside the Yield Book (1972): an
uncertain reinvestment rate is a major risk for all buyers of bonds. Very
simply, there was genuine urgency to lock in those almost unbelievable
real rates while they lasted and to take advantage of every volatility-
hedging technique that was available as well. Spurred on by returns as
good as or occasionally better than in the stock market, individual
investors kept right up with the institutions in going for the zeros and
the futures and, in the process, poured billions into the bond mutual
funds.
In short, it is hard to believe that these innovations would not have
played an important role in financial markets even if pension funds had
not found these instruments so accommodative to their needs.
A Closer Look at the Market for Corporate Bonds
The more interesting question is what all of this had to do with the
rise in the debt-equity ratio that is the focus of this conference. Most of
the long-duration instruments that attracted the pension funds wereDISCUSSION 127
governments, government derivatives like Treasury futures, or other
high-quality, liquid issues. Immunization and cash-flow matching are
tricky enough without adding basis risk and poor marketability to the
equation.
In the corporate bond market, on the other hand, where long-term
instruments are usually callable and where quality has continuously
deteriorated during the 1980s, the character of the environment has
been fundamentally different from the market for public securities.
Indeed, as a result of rising yields and little change in call protection, the
pattern in the corporate market has been for durations to shorten rather
than lengthen. This process applies to all corporate bonds, but it has
been most visible in the rapidly growing junk bond market. Here, the
combination of lower average maturities, extra-high current yields, and
short call features have tended to create durations that are significantly
shorter than durations in the more slowly growing high-quality corpo-
rate market.1 The additions of a varied and exotic set of equity kickers to
some of the junk bond issues, and an occasional junk bond in zero-
coupon form or with deferred coupons, represent efforts to satisfy the
demand for longer durations, but these quasi-bonds are hardly compa-
rable to the type of fixed-dollar obligations that Bodie’s paper is
discussing.
Within the context of this conference, the pertinent question is:
Why were Michael Milken and his cohorts able to find the mother lode
with such a high level of success? Why, in the light of the many intense
financial crises that the American economy had been through since
1969, were investors so eager to lend money on promises that were
significantly less secure than they had been in the past?
Only part of the answer to this question resides in the discussion up
to this point: the sheer beauty of the promised real return. The rest of
the answer, in my judgment, is precisely in the attraction of blurring the
distinctions between debt and equity.
At the dawn of the 1980s, equity investors had a most unhappy
bank of memories. From the end of 1965 to the middle of 1982, the
annual compound total return on the S&P 500 was a piddling 5.2 percent
a year, while inflation raged at 7 percent and Treasury bills also returned
7 percent. Lower-grade corporate bonds, on the other hand, appeared to
offer highly competitive returns or perhaps better, with significantly less
volatility than equities and, despite their low quality, a claim on
corporate assets that was still senior to the position of equity.
The theory of contingent claims teaches us that a corporate bond
1 Few junk bond issues have maturities beyond twenty years, and many eight- to
ten-year maturity issues have only three-year call protection. See Ross et al. (1989), p. 2.128 Peter L. Bernstein
can be priced as a call option on the company’s assets sold by the lenders
to the shareholders. This option will have a strike price equal to the
amount of the loan and a premium equal to the difference between the
riskless rate of interest and the going rate for loans of this type.
The shareholders can exercise the option by paying off the loan,
which they will do when their option is "in-the-money"--that is, if the
company’s assets comfortably exceed the claim of the lenders. If the
shareholders default, they let their option expire by leaving the assets in
the possession of the lenders. The value of that option will be a direct
function of the volatility of the underlying claim--namely, the structure
of the debt-equity ratio itself and the volatility of the underlying
business.
In view of their unhappy experiences in the stock market over a
period of some fifteen years, many investors found selling the volatility
to others an attractive proposition, especially when the premium com-
pared so favorably to what they had been earning on the other side of
the deal--and when, in addition, the volatility of the instrument itself
seemed to be significantly lower than the volatility of even the highest-
rated bonds. The ratios of equities to total assets in institutional
portfolios, as a result, have remained at levels well below the record
high levels of the late 1960s.2
Investors themselves have been making clear the distinction be-
tween this kind of investment strategy and the search by pension funds
for long-duration assets as described in Bodie’s paper. Institutional
investors are increasingly treating their lower-quality bond positions as
an asset class separated from their conventional bond portfolio--an
asset class with high expected returns but little covariance with longer-
duration nominal liabilities.
Further substantiation of this view may be found in a recent
Salomon Brothers document by Ross, Chacko, Palermo, and Warlick
(1989). This paper provides clear statistical evidence that high-yield
bonds have different risk profiles and less return volatility than conven-
tional bonds, as well as low correlations with all other asset classes. A
correlation of monthly returns from January 1985 to December 1988
shows an average correlation coefficient of only a little over 0.50 between
high-yield bonds and Treasuries or high-grade corporates, although
coefficients among these conventional bond market groupings run over
0.90. On the other hand, the high-yield sector’s correlation with the
2 These quasi-equity securities also found a ready market among investors who
wanted the higher expected returns from equity exposure but were denied it by regulatory
restrictions. This group includes the S&Ls, about which no elaboration is necessary.DISCUSSION 129
S&P 500 was 0.63, well above the correlation with the other segments of
the bond market.
How Much Bang for the Buck?
As an economist as well as an investor, I am concerned by the
nagging question of what the economy as a whole is getting out of all of
this. The negatives may well outweigh the positives: Friedman (1989),
for example, has argued strongly that our economy now has a new
externality in the form of enhanced corporate risk, as a result of the
dramatic deterioration in the debt-equity ratio and the gradual conver-
sion of pure debt into quasi-equity. The equally important issue is what
these micro developments mean for macro rates of return.
If the debt-equity ratio gives us some measure of the changes in
risk, the debt-income ratio is more revealing for purposes of analyzing
expected returns. And here the readings are not at all encouraging. The
ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to nonfinancial corporate gross
domestic product rose from 52 percent in 1982 to over 67 percent by the
end of 1988--a gain of 15 percentage points in just six years. Economists
traditionally consider debt creation stimulating and often blame it for
inflationary pressures, but the upward jump in the debt-GDP ratio tells
us that their traditional expectation in this instance was far wide of the
mark.
In fact, little indication can be found that all this borrowing was for
the purpose of financing the real growth of these corporations. The ratio
of business fixed investment and inventory accumulation to corporate
cash flow in this expansion has been no higher than average, so that
normal business needs for external finance have not been unusually
large. Rather, as we all know only too well, borrowers have used a major
proportion of the proceeds of new debt to purchase either their own
equity shares or the shares of other corporations. This means that the
borrowing went mostly to pay for existing assets rather than for the
creation of new assets.
But growth is important for lenders as well as for holders of equity,
and increasingly so as the process blurs the distinction between the two.
New earning assets in the business and new sources of revenue growth
help to secure the position of lenders at the same time that they benefit
the shareholders. Shuffling of pieces of paper, with the consequent shift
in the liability structure of the corporation, may do positive things for
management motivations and other aspects of the agency problem, but
better management must improve corporate performance by a whole lot
under these circumstances just to keep risk constant.
Hence, the issue is not really how the money is raised, but, rather,130 Peter L. Bernstein
what is done with the money after it is raised. This is the ultimate lesson
of Modigliani-Miller’s famous Proposition I (1958), which declares that
the value of the corporation is independent of its debt-equity ratio but is
dependent on the expected stream of earning power.
Looking from this perspective, it is appropriate to ask whether the
pressure for financial innovations is overwhelming the introduction of
technological innovations. In other words, are the increasing risks in the
corporate financial structure blunting management’s appetite for taking
the business risks with slow payoffs that are essential if we are to sustain
dynamic rates of real growth?
The import of these questions explains why it is my position that
the target of our concerns should be the ballooning debt-income ratios,
not the debt-asset or debt-equity ratios. When we finally return to
borrowing to finance growth rather than to shuffle the pieces of paper,
we will be on our way to a better future.
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Benjamin M. Friedman*
The subject of this conference is the extraordinary wave of mergers,
acquisitions, leveraged buyouts and stock repurchases that has swept
over so much of corporate America within the past half-decade. Al-
though the broad outlines of this phenomenon are by now fairly well
known, two aspects of what has happened do bear specific mention.
First, U.S. business corporations have borrowed in record volume, and
as a result the outstanding corporate debt is now greater in relation to
gross national product than at any time since World War II. In 1980 there
was 29 cents of corporate debt outstanding for every dollar of U.S. GNP.
Today the level is 38 cents on the dollar. The all-time peak was just 45
cents on the dollar, in 1928. Hence the increase in this debt ratio just
between 1980 and 1989 has already covered half the distance between
the 1980 level and the record debt load just before the Great Depression.
The second especially important feature of this wave of debt
issuance is that, by and large, firms have not borrowed these funds to
invest in new earning assets. Instead, corporations have borrowed
primarily in order to pay down their own equity and the equity of other
companies. The volume of equity paid down by U.S. nonfinancial
business corporations during the five years 1984 to 1988, measured in
excess of the proceeds of new shares issued during this period, was $444
billion. In the first half of 1989, nonfinancial corporations paid down
equity at the even faster rate of $143 billion per year.
The greatest puzzle surrounding these events is why all this is
happening just now. To be sure, firms may want to take on debt for
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many reasons. But the question is why the incentives to do so have
become so much greater in the 1980s. As Alan Auerbach’s paper in this
volume shows, it is not because tax incentives, or incentives associated
with inflation, have become greater. If anything, both of these have
dulled since 1980.
At first thought, Zvi Bodie’s paper appears to provide an answer to
this puzzle. In particular, the answer suggested by this paper is that the
issuers of corporate securities issue what the buyers want to buy, and
that identifiable changes affecting the buyers of corporate securities,
including especially private pensions, have altered their portfolio pref-
erences in the direction of wanting more debt rather than equity.
I am very sympathetic to Bodie’s fundamental assumption that
financial intermediation can, and does, importantly affect the asset
demands that the ultimate issuers of securities face. Moreover, Bodie’s
paper does an excellent job of identifying reasons (reasons that, impor-
tantly, are external to the relevant intermediaries themselves) why
pensions’ asset demands have, or at least ought to have, changed within
the past decade. Bodie points in particular to tax changes, FASB rulings
and, of course, the 1974 ERISA legislation. All this is both interesting
and well argued.
In the end, however, Bodie’s paper does not explain why the
corporate reorganization wave is happening in the 1980s, nor does it
answer the more limited question of why lenders have been willing to
absorb such large volumes of debt securities bearing risk properties that
make them more like equities. Bodie identifies as the primary driving
force behind these events the increasing desire on the part of lenders
(again, specifically pensions) to hedge their long-term nominal liabilities
against risk due to volatile interest rates--that is, to "immunize" these
liabilities. The result, as he convincingly demonstrates, is an increasing
demand for long-term nominal assets. But all this might just as well, or
perhaps even more appropriately, be a story about the demand for U.S.
government securities or for derivative products based on U.So govern-
ment securities, rather than something having to do with corporate
debt. Indeed, high risk of default, or of having to reschedule payments,
should have made corporate debt less attractive from the perspective of
the increasing desire for liability immunization on which Bodie’s paper
focuses. The analysis in Bodie’s paper therefore does not explain why
lenders have been willing to take on ever greater amounts of corporate
debt securities with risk properties resembling equities. (Bodie does note
in passing that overfunded pensions would logically have a demand for
equity, and therefore for equity-like debt, but he acknowledges that
neither his work nor that of other researchers has managed to turn up
any evidence that, in practice, overfunded pensions actually tend to
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One further aspect of Bodie’s discussion of pensions merits specific
comment in this regard. At the outset of the paper, he notes parenthet-
ically that most of his analysis of private pension funds ought also to
apply to state and local government retirement funds. On just the issue
that is the focus of this conference, however, these two kinds of pension
funds have behaved very differently in the 1980s. Private pension funds
have been net sellers of equity securities in every year since 1985. In the
first half of 1989, for example, private pension funds were net sellers of
equity at a rate of $10 billion per annum. This switch away from equity
is the heart of Bodie’s story. By contrast, state and local government
retirement funds have been large net buyers of equities throughout this
period. On average during the years 1985 to 1988, state and local
government pension plans were equity buyers at the rate of $26 billion
per annum. In the first half of 1989, state-local government pensions
bought equities at a $24 billion per annum rate.
Finally, pension funds--even including both those sponsored by
corporations and those sponsored by state and local governments--are
not the only category of lender that is relevant to the subject of this
conference. Especially in the context of this conference’s sponsorship by
a Federal Reserve Bank, it is also important to address the role of the
banks.
Commercial bank assets in the United States are now substantially
in excess of $3 trillion. Further, this $3 trillion-plus of bank assets is very
highly concentrated. Over $1 trillion of the total is at the nation’s largest
fifteen banks. And ironically, just as these top fifteen banks have been
reducing their exposure to the problem debts of developing countries,
they have been sharply increasing their exposure to debts issued in the
course of leveraged buyouts and other high-leverage corporate reorga-
nizations. It almost appears as if these banks have a competitive need for
high-risk assets, and since they are finally getting out of one high-risk
asset, competitive pressures are driving them into another. According to
a recent survey based on the annual reports that banks released in 1988,
the top fifteen banks in the United States had a combined total of $37
billion of leveraged buyout exposure. That amount exceeded these
banks’ entire risk-adjusted capital, even with all of their LDC debts at
that time taken at par value. Banks are clearly getting ever more heavily
into the high-leverage corporate debt business.
The question that therefore arises is whether, in the same way that
we stood by for years as savings and loan associations turned into
federally insured real estate funds, we may now be about to watch our
commercial banks become federally insured equity funds. If so, then
regardless of how our bankers view this development, our central
bankers should view it with serious concern.
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is that the purpose of this borrowing has not been to put in place new
assets, but to substitute debt for equity. As a result, the ratio of
corporate interest payments to corporate earnings (measured before
interest and taxes) has risen to an extraordinary level. On average in the
1950s and 1960s, 16 cents out of every dollar of corporate earnings went
to pay the interest bill. In the 1970s, when earnings growth suffered
while inflation raised nominal interest rates, the interest burden rose to
33 cents on the dollar. On average in the 1980s, it has taken 56 cents of
every dollar of corporate earnings just to pay corporations’ interest bills.
Despite the fact that nominal interest rates have fallen sharply and the
United States has enjoyed seven years of sustained economic expansion
with strong growth in earnings, interest payments have continued to
rise compared to earnings. (Comparable ratios of interest payments to
corporate cash flow are lower, of course, but the general trend is the
same.) Furthermore, while initially leveraged buyouts occurred mostly
in noncyclical industries, so that the risks attendant on a downturn in
earnings were lessened, by now the leveraged buyout wave has also
moved on to industries with a profoundly volatile character (for exam-
ple, airlines).
As a result of this substantially increased corporate debt burden,
together with the increasing volume of leveraged buyout lending by the
country’s major banks, it is appropriate to wonder what will happen the
next time the United States experiences an episode of tight money. Tight
money in this context means two things: high interest rates, and slow
(perhaps negative) earnings growth. It is therefore appropriate to ask
whether the risk of financial disruption associated with tight money
either has already, or will soon, become so great that the Federal
Reserve System will not be willing to impose an episode of tight money
even if one may be needed to arrest an accelerating inflation. For
example, despite the record of three decades (1950 to 1980) in which
inflation rose from near-nothing to double-digits primarily because, on
average over that time, the Federal Reserve erred on the side of
overexpansion, the Director of the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget recently criticized the Federal Reserve for, of all things, taking
the risk of erring on the side of underexpansion. Similarly, the most
recent Humphrey-Hawkins testimony presented by the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve System made clear that, as soon as it appeared that a
risk of recession might be present, the Federal Reserve immediately took
that risk as ground for easing its monetary policy.
This heightened aversion to recession is probably due, at least in
part, to the increased financial fragility that has resulted from the rise in
corporate indebtedness which is the subject of this conference. One
additional consequence of rising corporate indebtedness may therefore
be to complicate--indeed, to threaten and, ultimately, to impa~--ourDISCUSSION
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central bank’s ability to achieve stable prices. In addition to considering
the changing roles of debt and equity from the private lender’s perspec-
tive, therefore, it is also important to think carefully about how recent
changes in debt and equity financing look from the perspective of the
nation’s lender of last resort.